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The anatomy of autonomy: 




Few EU law principles have attracted as much attention in the last few years from 
such diverse audiences as that of autonomy. International and EU lawyers, 
constitutional and trade specialists, scholars and practitioners, decision-makers and 
the civil society have all been exercised by the implications that the principle of 
autonomy has in areas that range from the protection of fundamental human rights to 
investment arbitration.2 
This paper aims to reflect on the scope and legal implications of autonomy in two 
ways. First, it will step back and tease out four themes that emerge from the origins 
and development of the principle. It will, then, look forward by identifying three 
perspectives which are central not only to the position of the principle in the light of 
the recent Opinion 1/17 on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) between the EU and Canada,3 but also to its further evolution as a significant 
part of the fabric of the EU’s constitutional order. 
2 Looking back: four themes on the origins and 
development of autonomy 
2.1 First theme: judicial origin 
The principle of autonomy of EU law is the outcome of judicial creation. There is no 
reference to it in primary law. Instead, the principle emerged in the early 
                                                                    
1  Professor of EU Law and Jean Monnet Professor of EU Law at City, University of London; Barrister, 
Monckton Chambers, London. 
2  From the increasingly voluminous literature, see C Contartese, ‘The Autonomy of the EU Legal Order in 
the ECJ’s External Relations Case Law: From the “Essential” to the “Specific Characteristics” of the 
Union and Back Again’, (2017) 54 CMLRev 1627, P Koutrakos, ‘The Autonomy of EU law and 
International Investment Arbitration (2019) 88 Nordic Journal of International Law 41, J Odermatt, ‘The 
Principle of Autonomy: An Adolescent Disease of EU External Relations Law?’ in M Cremona (ed), 
Structural Principles in EU External Relations Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018) 291 and J.W. van 
Rossem, ‘The Autonomy of EU Law: More is Less?’ in R.A. Wessel and S. Blockmans (eds.), Between 
Autonomy and Dependence: The EU Legal Order Under the Influence of International Organisations 
(Berlin: Springer, 2013) 13. 
3  EU:C:2019:341. 
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constitutional case-law of the Court of Justice which stressed the fundamentally 
distinct character of the then new legal order. It was the conception of the latter as “a 
new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited 
their sovereign rights”4 that led to what appears now to be the unavoidable 
conclusion that, “[b]y contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has 
created its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an 
integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are 
bound to apply”.5 
It was this extraordinary character of the Community’s founding document, the 
unique legal features of its rules and their normative implications for the Member 
States that became the foundations of the autonomy of the Community, and later the 
Union, legal system. As the Court put it in Costa itself, “… the law stemming from the 
Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its special and original 
nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being 
deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the 
Community itself being called into question”.6 
2.2 Second theme: internal and external dimensions 
It was the above notion of the Union legal order as a new and distinct part of 
international law that gave rise to the process of constitutionalisation which led 
gradually and inexorably to the constitutional maturity and complexity of the current 
EU legal order.7 In this early context, autonomy had an internal dimension: it was 
intended to bolster the normative features of the nascent legal order in order to 
enable it to withstand challenges from national law. It was for this reason that the 
unique features of EU law were relied upon in order to enable the Court of Justice to 
assume a constitutional function and introduce the principles which shape the 
relationship between the EU legal order and the Member States and which also 
determine the legal status of individuals. In addition to the principles of supremacy 
and direct effect,8 these principles include the liability of national authorities for a 
violation of EU law,9 the gradual transformation of national courts into EU courts,10 
and the reliance upon general principles and fundamental human rights as a matter 
of EU law against both EU and national measures. 
                                                                    
4  Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, EU:C:1963:1. 
5  Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, EU:C:1964:66. 
6  ibid. 
7  On the ‘new’ aspects of the EU legal order, see S Weatherill, ‘From Myth to Reality: The EU’s “New 
Legal Order” and the Place of General Principles Within It’ in S Vogenauer and S Weatherill (eds), 
General Principles of Law – European and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017) 
21). 
8  See A. Dashwood, ‘From Van Duyn to Mangold via Marshall: Reducing Direct Effect to Absurdity?’, 
CYELS, 9 (2006-2007), 81. 
9  See M. Dougan, ‘The Vicissitudes of Life at the Coalface: Remedies and Procedures for Enforcing 
Union Law before the National Courts’ in G De Búrca and P Craig (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2011) 407. 
10  See A. Arnull, ‘Judicial Dialogue in the European Union’ in J. Dickson and P. Eleftheriadis (eds.), 
Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 109. 
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Over the years, the internal function of autonomy has met its objectives: the above 
principles have been accepted and applied by domestic courts as a matter of course 
and the EU and domestic legal orders interact successfully on the basis of a 
pragmatic understanding of their relationship.11 Since the 1990s, however, an 
external dimension of the principle of autonomy has emerged clearly and, at times, 
forcefully. This is now about protecting the distinct characteristics of the mature EU 
legal order from interferences that originate beyond the Union. 
This aspect of autonomy first appeared in Opinion 1/91 where the Court of Justice 
held that the European Economic Area Agreement constituted “a threat … to the 
autonomy of the Community legal order”:12 it would impinge on the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (provided now under Article 344 TFEU) to rule on 
the division of competence, and hence, the responsibility between the then EEC and 
its Member States in relation to the issues covered by the Agreement, and would 
interfere with the binding jurisdiction of the Court in relation to EU law issues adopted 
after the entry into force of the Agreement. 
The internal and external functions of autonomy are not easy to distinguish, either in 
conceptual or in policy terms. The EU’s judges render their judgment with an eye to 
national courts and, for instance in the Kadi cases,13 in full awareness of the 
potential role that national judges might be called upon to assume if judicial review in 
Luxembourg were viewed as deficient. In other words, by protecting the EU legal 
order against international rules that threatened the Union’s system of human rights 
protection, the Court also protected the EU legal order against recalcitrant domestic 
courts which might take it upon themselves to protect domestic human rights 
systems and, therefore, challenge the supremacy of EU law. After all, the Kadi 
judgment was rendered in the context of widespread and intense criticism of the UN 
rules and procedures governing the listing regime in question. In the multi-layered 
constitutional order of the EU, the intrinsic linkages between the internal and external 
function of autonomy condition the construction of the principle by the Court of 
Justice. 
2.3 Third theme: ambiguity 
There is considerable ambiguity, if not vagueness, inherent in what autonomy is 
actually about. In Opinion 1/00, for instance, the Court held that compliance with the 
principle would entail that “the essential character of the powers of the Community 
and its institutions as conceived in the Treaty remain unaltered”.14 This statement is 
open-ended and, given the judicial origins of the principle it purports to define, may 
only mean what the Court tells us it means on the basis of concrete cases about the 
compatibility with EU law of specific international treaties.  
                                                                    
11  See G. De Búrca, ‘The Evolution of EU Human Rights Law’ in De Búrca and Craig (eds.), op. cit. 465. 
12  Opinion 1/91, EU:C:1991:49, para. 35. 
13  Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi, EU:C:2008:461. 
14  Opinion 1/00 (European Common Aviation Area), EU:C:2002:231, para 12. 
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This theme is underlined by the Achmea judgment15 the line of reasoning of which is 
lacking in clarity. Whilst, for instance, the Court considers the violation of autonomy 
to be based on the violation of Articles 267 and 344 TFEU, the latter is not analysed 
in the judgment. Instead, autonomy is viewed through the lense of safeguarding the 
rights of domestic courts. This may be because Article 344 TFEU does not 
substantiate the broad reading of autonomy put forward in the judgment. After all, 
this provision refers to Member States only, and, therefore, does not cover actions 
brought by individuals.16 This lack of clarity is compounded by the high level of 
abstraction in which the language of the judgment is couched. This makes it difficult 
to gauge the precise content of the principle of autonomy and its implications for the 
Union’s broader investment policy. The abstract language of the judgment is all the 
more striking given the distinctly literal interpretation that characterises the recent 
case-law in other strands of EU external relations, such as treaty-making under 
Article 218 TFEU.17 As such, it may whet the appetite for a wide construction of 
autonomy. 
On the other hand, there are also elements in the judgment that may suggest a more 
narrow understanding of what autonomy is about, confining the judgment to the 
specific context of the case. After all, this was not just about an intra-EU BIT, but one 
whose jurisdiction clause in relation to the arbitration tribunal established thereunder 
was unusually broad in its scope. It is in this context that the reference to the 
principle of mutual trust must be understood,18 a point clarified in the more recent 
Opinion 1/17.19 
The ambiguity that underpins the articulation of autonomy is not confined to the 
case-law on investment arbitration. A case in point is the judgment in Mox Plant20 
which has attracted considerable criticism, especially by international lawyers.21 
Again, one would have to go past the unnecessarily convoluted reasoning of the 
judgment in order to consider its eminently sensible conclusion in the light of the 
specific legal and factual context of the case. After all, recourse to the enforcement 
proceedings laid down in EU primary law was sanctioned by Article 282 UNCLOS. 
Given that the case pertained to the interpretation of Article 344 TFEU, the concept 
of autonomy underpinning the judgment in Mox Plant is not as broad as it might 
appear.22  
                                                                    
15  Case C-284/16, Achmea, EU:C:2018:158. 
16  This point was also made by the referring court (paras 15-17), as well as AG Wathelet (paras 138-159). 
17  This theme is developed in P Koutrakos, ‘Institutional Balance and Sincere Cooperation in Treaty-
Making under EU Law’ (2019) 68 ICLQ 1-33. 
18  Case C-284/16, Achmea, op cit, para. 58. 
19  Opinion 1/17, op cit, paras 126-9. 
20  Case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland (re: Mox Plant), EU:C:2006:345. 
21  Koskenniemi considered the judgment ‘stunning’ and ‘squarely on the oldest, and most conservative 
trajectory of European thinking about the role of international law and its relations with national law’: M 
Koskenniemi, ‘International Law: Constitutionalism, Managerialism and the Ethos of Legal Education’, 
(2007) European Journal of Legal Studies (www.ejls.eu/1/3UK.pdf). 
22  See Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law 2nd ed (Oxford: Hart Publishing: 2015), at 184-191. 
The anatomy of autonomy: 
themes and perspectives on an elusive principle 94 
2.4 Fourth theme: autonomy is about power 
Over the years, the interpretation of the principle of autonomy has acquired a strong 
self-referential dimension - De Witte describes it as “a subtext of selfishness”.23 
Whilst it accepts, in principle, that a treaty setting up a judicial body with jurisdiction 
binding on the institutions of the parties, including the EU’s judiciary, may be 
compatible with the EU’s primary rules,24 the Court of Justice has been less than 
enthusiastic in its approach to such arrangements in practice. In Mox Plant, the 
initiation of a dispute between two EU Member States before an arbitral tribunal set 
up under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea was deemed to 
“involve a manifest risk that the jurisdictional order laid down in the treaties and, 
consequently, the autonomy of the Community legal system may be adversely 
affected”.25 In Opinion 1/09, the establishment of a European and Community 
Patents Court was viewed as contrary to the right of national courts to refer 
questions about EU patent law to the Court of Justice.26 Most controversially, the 
Court held in Opinion 2/13 that the draft agreement on the Union’s accession to the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), negotiated between 2010 and 
2013, was incompatible with the Union’s primary law.27 
What follows from the above is a rather narrow, Court-centred approach to the 
definition and implications of autonomy. A striking illustration of this theme was 
provided in Opinion 2/13: whilst ostensibly about the protection of human rights and 
the implementation of Article 6(2) TEU which requires that the Union accede to 
ECHR, the line of reasoning underpinning the Opinion had nothing to do in fact with 
the protection of fundamental human rights.28 It was, instead, about the institutional 
and procedural arrangements negotiated carefully—and not without some input from 
the Court of Justice itself—in order to ensure that the interpretation of EU law would 
be a matter left for the Court of Justice. This approach led to the co-operation with 
the European Court of Human Rights being treated suspiciously, even though the 
relationship between the two courts had been deeply symbiotic.29  
It has not, however, always been thus. The earlier case-law provided some 
indications that the application of the principle was not all about enhancing the 
powers of the Court of Justice. In Opinion 1/00, for instance, it was pointed out that, 
in accordance with autonomy, “the procedures for ensuring uniform interpretation of 
the rules of the [envisaged] Agreement and for resolving disputes will not have the 
                                                                    
23  B. De Witte, ‘A Selfish Court? The Court of Justice and the Design of International Dispute Settlement 
Beyond the European Union’ in M. Cremona and A. Thies (eds.), The European Court of Justice and 
External Relations Law: Constitutional Challenges (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014), pp. 33-46, at p. 39. 
24  Opinion 1/91, op cit, paras 39-40. 
25  Case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland (re: Mox Plant), op cit, para. 154. 
26  Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123. 
27  Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454. 
28  See, amongst others, B De Witte, ‘The Relative Autonomy of the European Union’s Fundamental 
Rights Regime’, (2019) 88 Nordic Journal of International Law 65-85. 
29  See, for instance, M Cartabia and S Ninatti, ‘Fundamental rights in the European Court of Justice and 
the European Court of Human Rights’ in S Douglas-Scott and N Hatzis (eds), Research Handbook on 
EU Law and Human Rights (Cheltenham: E Elgar Publishing, 2017) 211, S Greer, J.H. Gerards and R 
Slowe, Human rights in the Council of Europe and the European Union: achievements, trends and 
challenges (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), in particular chs 4 and 5. 
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effect of binding the Community and its institutions, in the exercise of their internal 
powers, to a particular interpretation of the rules of Community law referred to in that 
agreement ….”.30 This illustrates a rather restrained understanding of what autonomy 
would mean for the Union’s judiciary: it is about whether international judicial bodies 
would be endowed with the power to interpret and apply EU rules in a manner that 
would be binding on the EU’s institutions. This definition also includes domestic 
courts, in so far as they act as EU courts,31 a point to which this analysis will return 
below. 
It follows from the above that not only are the scope of autonomy somewhat 
nebulous and its limits ill-defined, but its function has also been intrinsically linked to 
furthering the powers of the Court of Justice. In other words, autonomy is, really, 
about power – what this power would cover, however, which actor would be 
endowed with it, and under which conditions is a matter left entirely for the Court of 
Justice to determine. 
3 Looking forward: three perspectives on the future of 
autonomy 
The analysis so far was about teasing out themes that emerge from the genesis and 
development of the principle of autonomy. The remaining of this paper focuses on 
the recent case-law on the principle, in particular Opinion 1/17, and identifies three 
perspectives that may shape the future of the principle. In doing so, the analysis 
draws on the theme of this book, that is building bridges, and explains how these 
perspectives are about bridges, either building or ignoring them.  
3.1 First perspective: pragmatism 
The more recent approach to autonomy by the Court of Justice emerges from 
Opinion 1/17. This is underpinned by a distinctly pragmatic streak which is illustrated 
in different ways. These may be classified as principled, policy, and procedural 
pragmatism.  
First, principled pragmatism is about openness to the role of other international 
tribunals. Opinion 1/17 starts off by acknowledging that, in principle, an agreement 
concluded by the EU may confer jurisdiction to interpret its provisions on a new court 
whose decisions may be binding on the EU.32 This in itself is hardly surprising, as the 
Court of Justice had made this point on a number of occasions in the past,33 only to 
show distinct reluctance to accept it as a matter of principle. In Opinion 1/17, 
                                                                    
30  Opinion 1/00, op cit, para 13. 
31  Under Art. 19(1) second subparagraph, ‘Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure 
effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law’. 
32  Opinion 1/17, op cit, para. 106. 
33  Opinion 1/91, EU:C:1991:490, paras 40 and 70; Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123, paras 74 and 76; 
Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, paras 182-3. 
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however, a different approach emerges. Having repeated this point of principle at the 
outset, the Court of Justice opines that the jurisdiction of the EU and domestic courts 
to interpret international agreements concluded by the EU does not take precedence 
over either the jurisdiction of the courts of the Union’s interlocutors or that of the 
international courts established under such agreements.34 It is in this context that 
reference is made to the “reciprocal nature of international agreements”.35 This 
emphasis on the role of non-EU courts is also apparent in other parts of the Opinion, 
where it is considered “consistent” with the nature of the CETA Tribunal beyond the 
EU legal system that there should be no mechanism for its interactions with the 
Court of Justice36 or for review of its decisions by the latter.37 
Second, there is also policy pragmatism in Opinion 1/17 that is illustrated by the firm 
acknowledgment of the powers of the Union’s institutions. In recognising the powers 
of other, non-EU, courts to interpret agreements concluded by the EU, the Court 
refers expressly to “the need to maintain the powers of the Union in international 
relations”.38 This point of emphasis is noteworthy, especially given the ongoing effort 
of the EU to reform the traditional Investor-State Dispute Settlement System and 
replace it, ultimately, with a Multilateral Investment Court.39 Given the ongoing 
negotiations under the auspices of UNCITRAL,40 the reference in the Opinion to “the 
need to maintain the powers of the Union in international relations” is a reminder of 
the intense policy context within which the CETA Opinion was rendered: it would 
have been a truly brave choice for the Union’s judiciary to make the Union’s 
executive and legislature unravel their policy on this matter. 
This policy pragmatism is all the more noticeable in the light of the formalist streak 
that underpinned the judgment in Achmea only a year earlier. That judgment 
illustrated a most orthodox reading of the orthodoxy of EU law. This emerged from 
the outset, as the question the Court set out to address in order to ascertain whether 
the ISDS mechanism in the intra-EU BIT ensures consistency with EU law was 
whether an EU law issue related to the dispute might be brought before an arbitral 
tribunal. This question, however, is too broad. As such, it enabled the Court to 
construe the reach of the EU legal order and, more to the point, the scope of its own 
jurisdiction in similarly broad terms. In essence, if taken literally, the judgment in 
Achmea may appear to suggest that every time an EU law issue pertains to a 
dispute before any international tribunal, the autonomy of the EU legal order would 
be at stake and the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction should be triggered. The 
implications of such a maximalist position would be striking. In fact, it would be 
difficult to envisage an international dispute settlement system which would meet this 
                                                                    
34  Opinion 1/17, op cit, para. 116. 
35  Opinion 1/17, op cit, para. 117. 
36  Opinion 1/17, op cit, para. 134. 
37  Opinion 1/17, op cit, para. 135.  
38  Opinion 1/17, op cit, para. 117. 
39  See European Commission Concept Paper, Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path for reform 
Enhancing the right to regulate and moving from current ad hoc arbitration towards an Investment 
Court. 
40  The negotiating directives are available here: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12981-
2017-ADD-1-DCL-1/en/pdf. 
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high normative threshold. After all, courts in all legal orders are faced with rules of 
other legal orders as a matter of course.41 In Achmea, therefore, autonomy had been 
construed broadly and in uncompromising terms, it had been about conflict and 
viewed the relationship between EU law and international investment law as an 
antagonistic one. It was against that background that the policy pragmatism that 
emerges from Opinion 1/17 is all the more noteworthy. 
Third, there is also procedural pragmatism in Opinion 1/17 and is about the Court’s 
approach to the procedural constraints that are imposed on the jurisdiction of the 
non-EU tribunal under the treaty concluded by the EU. The Court of Justice held that 
the principle of autonomy was complied with, as the jurisdiction of the CETA Tribunal 
would be confined to the provisions of CETA itself42 and would be exercised in 
accordance not with EU law but with international law applicable to the parties. 
Viewed against the prior case-law on autonomy, the jurisdiction of the CETA Tribunal 
would be narrow: it would not extend to the interpretation and application of EU law, 
as had been the case in Opinion 1/91;43 it would not trigger the principle of mutual 
trust, given that it would not pertain to relations between Member states, as had 
been the case in Achmea;44 and it would not extend to the determination of 
responsibility as between the EU and/or a Member State in actions brought before 
the Tribunal,45 hence meeting the requirement set out in Opinion 2/13.46 
The line of reasoning that underpins this procedural pragmatism is convincing. After 
all, the CETA Agreement contains various provisions which are emphatic in their 
objective to define the jurisdiction of the CETA Tribunal as narrowly as possible. In 
particular, these provisions read as if the drafters of CETA took utmost care to avoid 
any inferences that EU law, rather than CETA itself, would be interpreted in a binding 
manner by the CETA Tribunal. They were, therefore, in striking contrast to the broad 
scope of the jurisdiction clause in Article 8(6) of the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT in 
Achmea. 
And yet, as it emerges from Opinion 1/17, pragmatism is not merely a question of 
treaty guarantees. There is also a leap of faith that characterises the Court’s 
approach and that is absent in previous case-law. A case in point is the approach to 
the power of the CETA Tribunal “to consider … the domestic law of the disputing 
party as a matter of fact” under Article 8.31.2 CETA. This provision is viewed as 
consistent with the powers of the EU Courts, as it would not give rise to an 
interpretation of EU law by the Tribunal: whilst the examination by the latter “may, on 
occasion, require that the domestic law of the respondent Party be taken into 
                                                                    
41  The Court’s approach was in stark contrast both to the more pragmatic Opinion by AG Wathelet 
(EU:C:2017:699), as well as the nuanced approach of the Arbitral Tribunal itself in Achmea which had 
pointed out that ‘[c]ourts and tribunals throughout the EU interpret and apply EU law daily. What the 
ECJ has is a monopoly on the final and authoritative interpretation of EU law’ (PCA Case No 2008-13, 
Eureko B.V v Slovak Republic, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension (26 October 2010) 
para. 282. 
42  Art. 8.3.1. CETA. 
43  EU:C:2011:123. The point was made in Opinion 1/17 in paras 123-5, as well as in para. 133 regarding 
the Appellate Tribunal. 
44  Opinion 1/17, op cit, paras 126-9. 
45  Art. 8.21 CETA. 
46  Opinion 1/17, op cit, para. 132. 
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account”, “that examination cannot be classified as equivalent to an interpretation, by 
the CETA Tribunal, of that domestic law”, as it would only be as a matter of fact in 
cases where the Tribunal would be bound to follow the interpretation of EU law given 
by the EU authorities, whilst, in any case, the latter would not be bound by the 
Tribunal’s own interpretation.47 This approach differs from the formalist scepticism 
that permeated prior case-law. In Opinion 2/13, for instance, the Court had objected 
to the co-respondent mechanism because it would only be granted an opportunity to 
rule subject to an assessment by the ECtHR that there had been no CJEU case-law 
on the matter. This somewhat innocuous provision had been viewed by the Court of 
Justice as tantamount to conferring on the Strasbourg Court jurisdiction to interpret 
the CJEU’s case-law.48  
Viewed together, the principled, policy, and procedural strands of pragmatism 
examined in this section illustrate an approach that is more understanding of and 
conciliatory towards the different ways in which non-EU courts may deal with EU-
related issues. It is in this vein that the leap of faith mentioned above must be 
understood. It is noteworthy, for instance, that this leap of faith is not confined to the 
Court’s approach to autonomy in Opinion 1/17, but also to equal treatment under 
Article 20 of the Charter.49 It appears, therefore, that Opinion 1/17 suggests a shift of 
focus towards how best to ensure that the EU’s own power to interpret authoritatively 
EU law may be affected by the parallel jurisdiction of non-EU courts in interlocking 
proceedings. Even though the legal context in Achmea was different, had this been 
the focus of that judgment, the ambiguity raised by the Court’s opaque line of 
reasoning would have been avoided.  
3.2 Second perspective: substantive constraints 
In Opinion 1/17, the Court articulated a substantive constraint on the implications of 
autonomy: the CETA tribunal would have no jurisdiction to call into question the level 
of protection that the EU institutions choose about the Union’s fundamental interests, 
such as public security, public morals, to maintain public order, to protect human, 
animal or plant life of health. This conclusion was reached on the basis of three 
interrelated considerations. First, the CETA Tribunal may only rule on a specific 
restriction and on the situation of a specific investor, not generally about how the EU 
regulates the internal market.50 Second, CETA includes both general and 
investment-specific provisions that would prevent the parties from encroaching on 
substantive policy choices made by the parties.51 Third, the jurisdiction of the CETA 
Tribunal is circumscribed by Article 8.10.2 CETA which lists exhaustively the 
                                                                    
47  Opinion 1/17, op cit, para. 131. 
48  Opinion 2/13, op cit, paras 236-245. 
49  See Opinion 1/17, op cit, paras 185-6. 
50  Opinion 1/17, op cit, para. 148. 
51  The general provision is set out in Art. 28.3.2 CETA, whereas the investment-specific assurances are 
set out in Articles 8.9.1 and 8.9.2, as well as Points 1(d) and 2 of the Joint Interpretative Statement, and 
Point 3 of Annex 8-A to CETA. 
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situations in which the fair and equitable treatment obligation may be viewed to have 
been violated.52 
The articulation of this substantive dimension of the principle of autonomy is 
noteworthy, as it illustrates a break from a body of case-law that had focused on the 
procedural aspects of the principle. A glaring illustration of that trend was provided by 
Opinion 2/13 which, whilst ostensibly about the EU’s accession to the ECHR, was all 
about the scope and intensity of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. In fact, 
Opinion 1/17 is only the second ruling on autonomy that construes the principle in 
substantive terms.53 
There is also another aspect of autonomy that is novel, namely the emphasis in 
Opinion 1/17 not only on the requirement to preserve the powers of the EU’s 
institutions to protect the public interest as they see fit, but also on the democratic 
process that pertains to such choices. There are four references in the Opinion to the 
democratic process that underpins decision-making by the EU.54 These draw on the 
Joint Interpretative Instrument the preamble of which provides as follows: “The 
European Union and its Member States and Canada will therefore continue to have 
the ability to achieve the legitimate public policy objectives that their democratic 
institutions set, such as public health, social services, public education, safety, 
environment, public morals, privacy and data protection and the promotion and 
protection of cultural diversity”.55 
Τhe emphasis on democratic process may shed some light on the function of the 
substantive constraint that Opinion 1/17 appears to articulate. After all, the Joint 
Interpretative Instrument was adopted in October 2016 following the challenge to the 
process of ratification of CETA that the Walloon Parliament had raised. The purpose 
of the Instrument was to assuage concerns about the allegedly pernicious impact of 
the CETA dispute settlement mechanism on policy-making in the EU. There is, in 
other words, a deeply political context within which the very function of CETA had 
become deeply contested. It also worth recalling, in this vein, that, in its request for 
an Opinion under Article 218(11) TFEU, Belgium had asked specifically whether the 
CETA Tribunal might, in effect, undermine the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice by interpreting the terms ‘fair and equitable treatment’, indirect expropriation, 
or unjustified restriction on the freedom to make a payment56 in a manner that would 
overrule EU measures adopted in order to protected public interests pursuant to 
primary EU law. Viewed from this angle, the substantive policy layer that Opinion 
1/17 introduces provides a response to the deeply politicised context within which 
the Court was asked to rule on the compatibility of CETA with EU law. It is a nod to 
the increasingly vocal concerns about the impact of the EU’s trade deals, and the 
distinct scepticism, if not outright hostility, in Member States and parts of civil society. 
                                                                    
52  Opinion 1/17, paras 158-9. 
53  The first was in Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi, EU:C:2008:461 which was rendered in 
the context of the protection of fundamental human rights as a core principle of the Union’s 
constitutional order. 
54  Opinion 1/17, op cit, paras 151, 156, 159, and 160. 
55  Point 1(d). 
56  Arts 8.10, 8.12 and 8.13 CETA respectively. 
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It also illustrates an astute effort to address the potentially destabilising implications 
of the ensuing public disquiet for the ratification process. 
While the contested position of CETA may explain the introduction of the substantive 
aspect of autonomy in Opinion 1/17, it does not illuminate its legal implications. The 
part of the Opinion dealing with this issue lacks the clarity that we find in the earlier 
parts about autonomy. Instead, in its references to democratic process and the policy 
choices of the EU’s institutions, the Court appears to oscillate between the 
circumscribed jurisdiction of the CETA Tribunal and the regulatory autonomy of the 
CETA parties. Its line of reasoning, however, raises questions about the scope of the 
requirement that the Opinion articulates, the threshold it would introduce, and its 
implications for the jurisdiction of international tribunals established under treaties 
concluded by the EU. While quite context-specific in Opinion 1/17, it is not clear 
whether it may open the door to expanding further what the principle of autonomy is 
about. 
3.3 Third perspective: the role of domestic courts 
Domestic courts have played an increasingly prominent role in the development of 
the principle of autonomy. In Opinion 1/09, the Court concluded that the draft 
Agreement on the European and Community Patents Court, drawn up in the context 
of the European Patent Convention, was not consistent with the principle, as it would 
undermine the rights of domestic courts to refer questions about the interpretation of 
EU law to the Court of Justice.57 The pivotal role of domestic courts for the EU’s 
system of judicial review was also stressed in Opinion 2/1358 and the judgment in 
Achmea. Their prominence in the context of autonomy aims to strengthen the 
powers with which they are endowed under EU law. In Achmea, for instance, what 
was central to the Court’s conclusion was the impact of the intra-EU BIT on the 
binding jurisdiction of domestic courts, namely to deprive them of the power to 
exercise full judicial review under Article 267 TFEU. 
The other side of the coin, however, is the protection of the jurisdiction of the Court 
itself. After all, so intertwined is the function of domestic courts and the Court of 
Justice in the EU’s judicial system that safeguarding the jurisdiction of the latter 
entails the protection of the former. The emphasis on the role of the domestic courts 
makes the principle of autonomy appear less self-referential than it is and aims to 
address the view that autonomy amounts to ‘a rhetorical shield to help to protect the 
Court’s own exclusive jurisdiction’.59 Put differently, the more it focuses on domestic 
courts, the less autonomy may appear to be about the Court itself. 
While this view may come across as somewhat cynical, it is supported by the line of 
reasoning we find in the case-law which is, at times, broad-brush and far from 
                                                                    
57  Opinion 1/09, op cit, paras 80-89. 
58  Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, paras 175-6.  
59  B. de Witte, ‘European Union Law: How Autonomous is its Legal Order?’ 65 Zeitschrift für öffentliches 
Recht (2010) 141, at 150. 
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convincing. There is, for instance, some delicious irony in the fact that the Court’s 
concern in Achmea for protecting the power of the domestic court to refer would be 
expressed in response to a preliminary reference. In fact, the broad terms in which 
the role of domestic courts was approached in that judgment is striking. Reference 
was only made to two factors: the final nature of the award and the freedom of the 
tribunal to choose its seat and law applicable to the procedure; and the fact that 
domestic courts may only review the award to the extent that national law permits. 
There was no discussion of the central role of domestic courts in enforcing arbitral 
awards or their power to condition the enforcement of such awards on the basis of 
their compatibility with public policy.60 And whilst the public policy exception is not 
provided for in all international investment regimes,61 it was not prohibited under the 
rules pertaining to the enforcement of the arbitral award in Achmea. 
In the light of the above, there is a somewhat paternalistic streak in how domestic 
courts are approached within the context of the principle of autonomy. The rhetoric is 
about their significance in the EU’s judicial architecture, but, in fact, they are not 
entrusted with protecting autonomy themselves. This approach is in contrast with a 
more liberal view of the position of domestic courts. In his Opinion in Achmea, 
Advocate General Wathelet had relied upon the role of the latter in enforcing arbitral 
awards in order to point out how they could, in fact, protect autonomy.62 Having 
pointed out that arbitral awards may only be enforced by domestic courts, he had 
argued that, in principle, the latter are largely granted leeway under international 
investment law to rely upon EU law and protect EU rules as a matter of public 
policy.63 His approach, therefore, highlighted a different function for domestic courts 
in the context of autonomy: rather than in need of protection, they were, actually, 
themselves active guarantors of the principle. 
The judgment in Achmea made no reference to the Opinion of Advocate General 
Wathelet. And yet, there is a lot to suggest that a more trusting approach to domestic 
courts would be warranted. This is borne out by the ongoing episode of the Micula 
saga that has been playing out before English courts. Having obtained an arbitral 
award in their favour, the claimants sought to enforce it before, amongst others, 
English courts. The award was registered in the High Court by means of an Order 
pursuant to the domestic law implementing the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID 
                                                                    
60  In Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss, EU:C:1999:269, it was held that a domestic court could refuse to enforce 
an arbitral award on public policy grounds, including compliance with the EU’s competition and state 
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62  EU:C:2017:699, paras 229 et seq. 
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Convention) in the UK.64 The Order was challenged by the Romanian Government, 
supported by the Commission, on EU law grounds. 
In January 2017, the High Court rejected the Romanian appeal but granted a stay of 
enforcement proceedings pending the resolution by the General Court of the 
annulment action against the Commission’s Decision that had found the enforcement 
of the award to constitute payment of unlawful state aid.65 This decision was based 
on a distinction between registration and enforcement of the arbitral award: while 
necessary under domestic law implementing ICSID, registration did not amount to 
enforcement and could not, therefore, give rise to the risk of a conflict between 
decisions of domestic and EU institutions. This was not the case with the 
enforcement of the award, as it hinged on the determination of issues pending before 
the EU courts. Mr Justice Blair equated the award, following its registration under 
English law, to a final domestic judgment. As domestic courts are bound by EU law 
and the duty of cooperation, the High Court cannot therefore proceed to enforce the 
judgment consequent on registration of the Award in circumstances in which the 
Commission has prohibited Romania from making any payment under the Award to 
the claimants because in doing so, the court would, in effect, be acting unlawfully. 
This does not (in the court’s view) create a conflict with the international obligations 
of the UK as contained in the 1966 Arbitration Act implementing the ICSID 
Convention in UK law, because a purely domestic judgment would be subject to the 
same limitation.66 
Upheld by the Court of Appeal,67 this approach is elegant and distinctly pragmatic: 
on the one hand, it seeks to comply with EU law and take seriously the obligations 
under which domestic courts function; on the other hand, it is faithful to the letter of 
the international commitments assumed by the United Kingdom in the context of 
ICSID. 
The disjunction examined in this section between the rhetoric about the role of 
domestic courts as EU law courts and the practice of entrusting them with 
safeguarding EU law is not confined to the principle of autonomy. We also find it in 
another area of acute sensitivity for the EU legal order, that is the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, where the Court has interpreted its limited jurisdiction broadly at 
the expense of the jurisdiction of domestic courts to review EU measures.68 In the 
context of this paper, however, it follows from the above that domestic courts need 
not become the cloak for a narrow and inward-looking conception of autonomy of EU 
law. In fact, they may become a more active participant in safeguarding the essential 
characteristics of the EU legal order that the principle of autonomy is designed to 
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protect. Viewed from this angle, autonomy would become truly multi-dimensional in 
its scope and subtler in its implications. 
4 Conclusion 
Looking back at the genesis and development of the principle and, then, reflecting on 
its current state and further evolution, this paper highlighted the significance of the 
context within which autonomy is examined in the case-law. Autonomy may mean 
different things in different contexts. The CETA provisions, for instance, were 
carefully drafted in order to give as little ammunition as possible to any concern 
about impinging on the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, and not all dispute 
settlement provisions in agreements concluded by the EU have been drafted in such 
manner. 
Viewed from this angle, and even though we have become familiar with the far 
reaching implications of autonomy, we are still not clear about what it means in a 
number of significant legal settings. For instance, the role of investment arbitration in 
intra-EU BITs is far from over. While the Member States declared in January 2019 
that they would revoke such agreements by the end of 2019 and, in any case, they 
withdrew their consent to arbitration with immediate effect, no arbitral tribunal has 
agreed so far not to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the judgment in Achmea and 
the above declarations.69 There is also the issue of managing existing claims brought 
under the relevant BITs. Similarly, the impact of Achmea and Opinion 1/17 on the 
Energy Charter Treaty is still unclear. This is an important question, not least 
because arbitral tribunals have consistently declined to accept that the Court’s case-
law so has any relevance to arbitration under that Treaty.70 
It is indicative of the dynamic nature of the EU legal order that such important 
questions about the function of such a pivotal principle should still be open. 
Autonomy emerges, therefore, as defined by the very characteristics that have 
shaped the overall constitutional order that it is designed to protect: constantly 
evolving and flexible in both its scope and implications, it challenges our 
understanding of not only how EU law may interact with international law, but also 
how domestic courts may interact with the CJEU. 
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